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In early 2000, protests erupted across the city of Cochabamba, Bolivia, in response to the 
privatization of the city’s water source by a multinational consortium, in accordance with 
a World Bank initiative. In what became known as the Water War, the people of 
Cochabamba joined together to fend off international power in favor of local autonomy. 
This project examines how and why the internationalization of Bolivia’s nature and space 
came into conflict with decolonial modes of thinking to bring about the Water War in the 
late 1990s, and what this illuminates about power and geographic scale. Through a deep 
historical analysis of Bolivia’s indigenous groups and their interactions with colonial 
powers, the Bolivian state, and international development actors, this thesis looks at how 
Bolivia became internationalized so as to invite neoliberalism in the 1990s. Then, through 
first-hand narratives and decolonial theory, this thesis looks at the creation of a successful 
resistance movement. It argues, through the lens of postcolonialism, that institutions, 
ideologies, and models of development created out of historic colonial relations, like the 
World Bank and neoliberalism, perpetuate and exacerbate global inequalities in the name 
of aid and development. This postcolonial lens illustrates how decisions surrounding 
water allocations and water system management in the age of climate change are nested 
in complex, multi-scalar processes founded on accumulation and dispossession. In an age 
where water distribution is increasingly contested, the Water War offers alternative 
conceptions of nature, power, and control that move beyond exploitative neocolonial 
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Quiet small-talk and the noise of minibuses on the streets five floors below us 
surrounded me as our group of 31 students waited eagerly for our guest speaker to arrive. 
We were sitting in a classroom in the middle of Cochabamba, Bolivia, on a cloudy 
afternoon in May 2016, and we were exhausted from a full day of classes, and from 
almost four months of travel.  
When he entered the room, we sat up and quieted down. He was smaller than I 
expected, and as he started to speak, his voice was low. He was fidgety. He seemed 
nervous. He stood at the front of the bare classroom, next to an English translator, and 
began to tell his story.  
He was Oscar Olivera, a key leader of the Cochabamba Water War of 2000. As he 
told us stories from his life leading up to his organizing efforts in the movement, his 
voice gained strength. Soon we could feel the fight and passion within him. By the end of 
the two hours, after scribbling furiously to capture his words, I was captivated. 
He told the story of a series of protests that erupted in the streets of Cochabamba 
against the privatization of the city’s water system. He told us how he, along with four 
other leaders, synthesized large amounts of information about the privatization and its 
expected effects into five main points that were comprehensible to everyone. He told us 
how the people literally occupied, cooked and slept in the streets, and began to talk. As 
neighbors got to know each other, they realized how much they had in common, and they 





With the power of their own voices and actions, Olivera and the people overcame 
the tyranny of a powerful multinational corporation attempting to privatize and profit off 
their water source. The privatization had come from a World Bank initiative as a 
condition to continue receiving loans, and the city’s water system was taken over by the 
San Francisco, California-based company, Bechtel.  
The people of Bolivia were tired of the state aligning with outside international 
actors to make decisions for them. As Olivera said, the water “belongs to everyone, not to 
the state. And above all, it’s a heritage of nature” (Olivera 2016). The people of 
Cochabamba wanted autonomy over their water, particularly in an era where privatization 
of water and utilities had become the newest wave of profit-making.  
Their effort to overthrow Bechtel was successful.  
As I left the classroom that day, questions swirled through my mind. Why were 
the people of Bolivia successful in overthrowing a multinational corporation when many 
people elsewhere were not? We had been to Vietnam and Morocco as part of the study 
abroad program that brought us to Bolivia1, and we had heard from communities in both 
countries about emotional and violent cases of water grabbing. This process of water 
grabbing, or “a situation where powerful actors are able to take control of, or reallocate to 
their own benefits, water resources already used by local communities” (Mehta et. al. 
2012, 197), happens in all corners of the world, taking on many forms of oppression, 
violence, racism, and disregard for indigenous or local people. Why is this a global trend? 
Why was the Bolivian case different? Could a deeper look at the Cochabamba Water War 
help to illuminate other similar processes and wars over water relations in a world where 
                                                
1 The program was SIT International Honors Program: Comparative Climate Change and 





water scarcity is increasing? These questions remained in my head throughout the rest of 
my time in Bolivia, and, over time, led me to the central question of my thesis: how and 
why did the internationalization of Bolivia’s nature and space come into conflict with 
decolonial modes of thinking to bring about the Water War in Cochabamba in the late 
1990s, and what does this illuminate about power, geographic scale, and resistance? 
 
Existing Literature 
Though much has been written about the Water War, a deeply historical and 
geographic story that looks at Bolivia within a global and transnational context is 
missing. Key literature on the Water War itself includes Cochabamba! by Oscar Olivera 
(2004). Olivera’s first-hand account, accompanied by other perspectives before, during, 
and after the Water War, is crucial to understanding what it was like on the frontlines of a 
water rebellion. Not only does this book help to paint a more clear and personal account 
of what happened leading up to and during the Water War, it also provides an analysis of 
neoliberalism, a real account of an effective counter movement, and helpful strategies for 
organizing against power.  
Many other articles have been written about the Water War, both academic and 
news articles. Notable pieces include Assies (2003), Lobina (2000), and many news 
articles from the time. To varying degrees, these pieces detail the privatization, the 
conflict, and the resolution. They help to create an understanding of the recent context 
from which the Water War emerged. While my thesis includes many of these details as 
well, it expands beyond in both space and time.   





Water Wars by Indian scholar and activist Vandana Shiva (2002). Her discussion 
illuminates that while each water war plays out differently due to its political, social, 
economic, and geographic contexts, there are many key similarities as well. A deeper 
analysis of the power underlying these water wars helps to illuminate the international 
processes that produced these conflicts  
The power in the Bolivian case came in large part from the World Bank. In his 
book Imperial Nature, Michael Goldman (2005) uncovers the trajectory of World Bank 
development projects, with a significant section dedicated to neoliberalism and water in 
the 1980s and 1990s. This book offers insight into the Water War by making sense of 
water privatization and World Bank development more broadly, helping to illuminate the 
broader global context of international economic aid.  
Where my thesis comes in is in developing a deeply historical and geographic 
account of the making of Bolivia as a place where the World Bank could introduce a 
neoliberal project. The opening up of Bolivia to international actors due to a long history 
of colonization and neocolonization helps to illuminate why the privatization occurred in 
the first place. Further, looking at the divergence of understandings surrounding nature 
and autonomy helps to illuminate alternative ways of thinking and living that challenge 
dominant rhetoric. What happened in Cochabamba was a crucial sign to those in power 
that the power of the people is strong when they join together to fight for a cause they 
care deeply about.  
 
Theoretical Framework  





deeply about scale and power, and consider questions of conflicting views on nature, 
space, and autonomy.  
A key theme in the conflict over the water was the differing views surrounding 
water and therefore nature. In contemporary Euro-dominated economic thought, nature 
exists separately from humans. As people began to see themselves as separate from 
nature, dominant over nature, and free to use and exploit nature to meet their own 
needs—seeing nature as “natural resources” for human use—humans placed themselves 
in a hierarchical category above nature that “justifies” domination over nature.  
However, not all relationships to nature are based on domination. In Bolivia, 
many people relate to nature through beliefs surrounding Pachamama, or Earth Mother, 
and Buen Vivir, or living well. The discourse and practice of Buen Vivir “emerges out of 
idealized Andean constructs of gender complementarity: harmony and equilibrium 
between men and women, egalitarian ayllu communities [to be described in chapter 2], 
and protection of natural environment” (Fabricant 2013, 164), and has been mobilized 
recently in Bolivia beyond indigenous communities to encompass a mode of living that 
includes living in harmony with Pachamama. While these concepts are idealized and 
stereotyped, they come out of a movement by the indigenous majority to incorporate 
these ideas into the new constitution under the Evo Morales government. Though they 
come from indigenous roots, many non-indigenous or mestizo (a person of mixed 
indigenous and Eurpean ancestry) campesinos (peasant farmers), have been incorporated 
into these models as well, and have helped Bolivia become a frontrunner in indigenous, 
campesino, and Earth rights worldwide. However, the incorporation of these beliefs into 





extraction economy, and these indigenous worldviews sometimes exclude urban or non-
indigenous populations within Bolivia. Still, they represent a departure from the 
hegemonic beliefs surrounding nature. 
Because there is a diminishing amount of space untouched by humans (what 
Lefebvre calls “First Nature”), we must reconceptualize what is understood as nature. 
Erik Swyngedouw (1999) argues that nature is inherently social and political; nature and 
society mutually shape each other, and we cannot speak of “nature” or of “humans” 
without some discussion of their historical, social, environmental, and political contexts. 
Swyngedouw notes that as we continue to shape nature beyond recognition in the push 
for development, modernization, and profit, the distinction between nature and society is 
breaking down. This leads us to socionature, a notion that rejects the false separation of 
society and nature, and a recognition that nature and society are constantly mutually 
constructing and reconstructing one other. When I discuss nature or different ideologies 
surrounding nature, what that really means is different ideas about how we relate to 
natural resources and our larger environment. 
In thinking about how we relate to our larger environment, it is important to look 
at how the products and resources we use are related to the larger environment, and thus 
represent socionatural networks. For example, Swyngedouw quotes Latour saying, “if I 
were to capture some water in a cup and excavate the networks that brought it there, ‘I 
would pass with continuity from the local to the global, from the human to the 
nonhuman’” (Latour 1993:121 in Swyngedouw 1999, 445). As Swyngedouw argues,  
These flows would narrate many interrelated tales, or stories, of social 
groups and classes and the powerful socioecological processes that 
produce social spaces of privilege and exclusion, of participation and 





transformations, the global hydrological cycle, and global warming; 
capital, machinations, and the strategies and knowledges of dam builders, 
urban land developers, and engineers; the passage from river to urban 
reservoir, and the geopolitical struggles between regions and nations. In 
sum, water embodies multiple tales of socionature as hybrid.  
 
In describing water in this way, Swyngedouw elucidates the incredible importance and 
complexity of water as a vital resource in virtually every space, shaping social conflicts 
and socionatural landscapes. In order to deeply understand water’s social and material 
interactions, we must situate our analyses in the dynamic and historical processes of 
accumulation and dispossession. These processes can be illuminated in conversation with 
theory surrounding space, scale, place, and power. 
Space, place, and scale are embedded in every interaction and yet are rarely 
theorized outside the field of geography. Doreen Massey (2005) argues that space is often 
unthought, in contrast to time, which consciously mediates our every interaction. By 
overlooking the relationship between space and time, Massey argues that governments 
like the United States have been able to paint globalization as inevitable, and the 
relationships of globalization as relationships of time. Doing so disables us from 
understanding developing countries “as having their own trajectories, their own particular 
histories, and the potential for their own, perhaps different, futures. [In our time-centric 
understandings,] they are merely at an earlier stage in the one and only narrative it is 
possible to tell” (Massey, 5). In discounting that other groups of people may understand 
and desire “development” in a different way than the United States or Western Europe, 
development rhetoric ignores the possibility of multiplicity and heterogeneity across 
space. Recognizing the interactions between space and time and the existence of multiple 





In thinking about resistance, Leitner, Sheppard and Sziarto (2008) argue that 
scale, place, and positionality help illuminate contentious politics, which can be described 
as “concerted, counter-hegemonic social and political action, in which differently 
positioned participants come together to challenge dominant systems of authority, in 
order to promote and enact alternative imaginaries” (Leitner, Sheppard and Sziarto 2008, 
157). This definition is deepened when in conversation with spatial ways of viewing and 
understanding the world. Across the commonly defined scales—global, international, 
national, regional, local, and individual—it is important “to examine the ways in which 
various scales articulate with one another,” because “scale is conceptualised as a 
relational, power-laden and contested construction that actors strategically engage with, 
in order to legitimise or challenge existing power relations” (Leitner, Sheppard and 
Sziarto 2008,159). Thus, multi-scalar analyses help to illuminate the shaping of place.  
Place signifies the locations of daily life, and the interactions between materiality 
and social relations. Objects of exclusion—such as fences or walls—help define to whom 
the place belongs, and thus the importance of positionality in navigating space and place. 
Positionality is the recognition of relational and subjective ontologies and epistemologies 
and the dominant or subordinate constructed nature of those relations. Both social and 
spatial relationships define these positionalities. Sometimes within one space an identity 
might be marginalized, while in another space it would be privileged. Recognizing 
intersectionality—the interaction between power-laden identities or positionalities—is 
crucial in building solidarity in counter movements to hegemonic power (Leitner, 
Sheppard and Sziarto 2008).  





different motives or situations. From powerful dictators to powerful movies, from 
“knowledge is power” to “people power,” from power plants to power tools, it truly is 
everywhere. But what is power? Michael Mann (2012) argues that, “societies are 
constituted of multiple overlapping and intersecting sociospatial networks of power” 
(Mann 2012, 1). He goes on to define four sources of social power relationships—
ideological, economic, military, and political—that are based on organization, control, 
logistics, and communication (Mann 2012, 2). Ideological power rests on the ability to 
monopolize claims to normative social organization of knowledge, meaning, and 
practices (Mann 2012, 22). Economic power utilizes the ability to realize “subsistence 
needs through the social organization of the extraction, transformation, distribution, and 
consumption of the objects of nature,” where a dominant class monopolizes control of the 
economic means (Mann 2012, 24). Military power uses authoritative organization that is 
“concentrated, coercive, and highly mobilized” (Mann 2012, 8) within the troops, in 
order to control force across large geographic and social spaces (Mann 2012, 26). Finally, 
political power, or state power, is centralized, institutionalized, and territorial, and 
heightens boundaries, as opposed to the other forms of power that transcend or expand 
boundaries (Mann 2012, 26-27).  
Throughout my thesis, another kind of power emerges—the power of 
communities in the Third World. This can be understood in Chandra Mohanty (2003)’s 
framework. She defines “Third World,” as “geographical location and sociohistorical 
conjunctures [which…] incorporates so-called minority peoples or peoples of color in the 
United States” (Mohanty 2003, 44) and other places. In reclaiming the phrase “Third 





poverty, “but it is also a world with powerful histories of resistance and revolution in 
daily life and as organized liberation movements” (Mohanty 2003, 44). She recognizes 
the power that can be accrued and asserted in forms of resistance. By reclaiming the 
phrase, Mohanty highlights that people at the bottom of our constructed hierarchies have 
agency, and they have power. Just because this power is ignored by those who write 
histories does not mean it does not exist.  
Combining power and scale, we can begin to analyze the multi-scalar interactions 
of power at work in political decision-making processes. Nation-states shape each other 
as they interact, because these interactions occur across scale and power differentials, 
though the amount that each nation-state is shaped by outside forces varies. Nevins 
(2005) argues that we must look at actors and groups within nation-states whose interests 
may more closely align with groups in other nation-states. As he argues, “rather than 
seeing countries as unified rational actors carrying out foreign policies for reasons of 
national interest, those employing a political-economy approach focus on how elite 
groups shape national agendas to a degree disproportionate to their numbers and project 
national power onto the world stage—in part by working through international and 
transnational mechanisms, military, political, and economic elites, and institutions 
abroad” (Nevins 2005, 18-19). This helps to illuminate the power that elite groups have 
to ignore the interests of the majority by aligning themselves with more powerful 
international actors.  
In Bolivia, we see evidence of the governmental elites making decisions more in 
line with international actors than in favor of their own people. Part of this comes from a 





Bolivia has been constructed as an internationalized space. An internationalized space is 
one that, despite being nominally sovereign, is, to some degree, dependent on, 
accountable to, accessible by, and/or controlled by, the interests of outside, international 
actors. Internationalized spaces have points of access for international access due to the 
complex history of power relations. These points of access are defined both by the state 
and by the international actors, through complicated, power-ridden, dialectical relations 
in which the actors have varying degrees of choice and autonomy.  
In this thesis, I argue that Bolivia’s space has been internationalized through 
processes of colonialism, neocolonialism, and neoliberalism, and while the international 
actors have changed throughout the years, the effect, in the eyes of the people of Bolivia, 
is essentially the same. Thus, Bolivia as an internationalized space has been shaped, 
conquered, and exploited. But as the end of this thesis suggests, counter-movements can 
be successful against the global consolidation of power. 
 
Methodology and Methods 
This thesis analyzes the world through a postcolonial lens, with an emphasis on 
the coloniality of power, a specific category theorized by Quijano to analyze various 
forms of colonialism and postcolonialism in the American colonies (Castro-Gómez 2008, 
280-291). Postcolonialism broadly refers to the academic discipline that recognizes and 
analyzes the lasting effects of colonialism, and the colonial legacies that continue to take 
on different forms but continue to shape life in former colonies.  
In talking about postcolonialism in Latin America, various scholars have argued 





appropriately address the unique form that colonialism and neocolonialism have taken on 
the continent, as compared to Africa and Asia. Thus, Walter Mignolo and Aníbal Quijano 
developed the conception of “coloniality of power” as a world-system that pushes beyond 
postcolonialism and the simplification of dynamics between Europe and its former 
colonies. Mignolo and Quijano argue that there has also been a “production of hierarchies 
and differences among the colonized” (Castro-Klaren 2008, 133-134); for example, Peter 
Hulme (2008) argues that the United States and Argentina after independence are 
arguably postcolonial nations, and yet they became “immediately themselves colonizing 
powers with respect to the native populations of the continent whose lands and resources 
they covet” (Hulme 2008, 392). So coloniality of power recognizes the multi-scalar 
postcolonialisms, and multi-scalar dimensions of power and domination that are present 
within postcolonialism in Latin America. It is through this lens that I analyze the Water 
War. I argue that, through understandings of postcolonialism and coloniality of power, 
we can make sense of the hierarchies of power present in Bolivia throughout its history.  
In order to look deeply at these historic and geographic hierarchies of power, this 
thesis relies heavily on many sources, including literature that is both theoretical and 
empirical, academic articles, investigative journal reports, and news stories. I pull from 
sources from before, during, and after the Water War, paying close attention to the 
historical context at the time of the publication. I also incorporate narratives from a few 
people involved in the Water War, some of which is from the six weeks I spent in 
Cochabamba in May and June of 2016, to further develop my analysis. Using these many 
sources, I weave simultaneous histories of Bolivia and neocolonial structures of power 





geographically broader sense.   
 
Chapter Narrative 
In chapter 2, I discuss the Spanish colonization of Bolivia, and ask the question of 
how the production of Bolivia as an internationalized space through colonialism began. 
This chapter traces the history of colonization and European influence, starting in the 
1500s, through Bolivian independence in 1825. This history forms the basis for the next 
chapters in introducing how, through Spanish colonization, Bolivia’s space and nature 
were internationalized. I argue that Bolivia’s indigenous groups have maintained much of 
their own unique worldviews and social practices, despite the region’s resources being 
produced by, accessible to, and dependent on outside public and private actors. These 
processes had a profound and lasting impact when the region became a recognized 
independent state.  
In chapter 3, using the framework established in chapter 2, I demonstrate how 
Spanish colonial presence and economic ties to the outside world impacted Bolivia long 
after its independence. In the first years of independence, Bolivia as a state was weak and 
poor, and due to many factors including increasing globalization and increasing desire for 
precious natural resources, it quickly became economically dependent on other actors. 
These actors included private U.S. banks in the early 1900s and oil companies later in the 
1920s and 1930s. Emerging from WWII, global economic aid began with the creation of 
the World Bank and the IMF. This chapter traces the simultaneous histories of the World 
Bank and Bolivia, and their increasing interaction. Through the lens of postcolonialism, I 





maintaining the same hierarchical structures under different actors and rhetoric.  
In chapter 4, I continue to trace postcolonial threads of international aid and 
international influence into the 1980s and 1990s, when neoliberalism and green 
neoliberalism became dominant development rhetoric. I explore how complex histories 
of economic aid, close ties between private corporations and dominant governments, and 
the lack of representation of the majority within the Bolivian government help to make 
sense of the decision in 1999 in Cochabamba to privatize the water system.  
In chapter 5, I address the specifics of the Water War in response to the 1999 
decision. Employing a lens of decoloniality, I explore how the Water War set a precedent 
in Bolivia of decolonization and of (re)establishing ways of living that are outside the 
colonial mindset and power relations. I introduce alternative voices and conceptions of 
nature and space outside of the mainstream World Bank narrative, including theory on 
decoloniality and decolonization of social organization, solidarity networks, and 
epistemologies. I complicate ideas surrounding Bolivia’s nature and space by bringing in 
stories from Oscar Olivera and other people who fought in the Water War. By joining 
together in solidarity, multiple interest groups within Cochabamba created alliances 
despite difference that demonstrated the power of the people in fighting against the elites 
in a decolonial fight.  
To conclude, I move into the years after the Water War, discussing new 
conceptions of resources and resistance, both within Bolivia, and on a global scale. I 
explore how decolonial mindsets during the Water War translated into the election of Evo 
Morales and his Movimiento al Socialism (MAS- Movement towards Socialism) political 





a new constitution that recognizes the rights of Pachamama (Earth Mother). Despite the 
strides toward decoloniality in Bolivia, the country still struggles with relative poverty 
and extreme drought. Water remains a contested resource, and as the glaciers recede 
further and the lakes dry, it will remain a crucial issue. This chapter concludes with some 
broader themes and questions that expand beyond the Bolivian context, addressing 
problems of resource shortage, neoliberalism, and postcolonial institutions, as well as 









Colonialism: The Roots of Internationalization 
 
 The internationalization of Bolivian space and nature began much before Bolivia 
itself existed, starting with Spanish arrival in the greater Andean region in 1532. 
Understanding the early history of the Andean region, both outside of and in relation to 
colonialism, helps to make sense of Bolivia at the moment of independence, and in the 
years following. The physical geography and social fabric of Andean indigenous cultures 
help to explain the uniqueness of the region and of the shape colonialism took. Because 
the Andes were not as accessible as many other places in South America, there was 
limited influx of European masses, resulting in the indigenous groups remaining the 
majority class. While the colonial elites still implemented many “westernizing” and 
“civilizing” projects, and changed the region dramatically and often violently, the 
indigenous people were able to maintain much of their culture and uniqueness. This 
chapter looks at the physical landscape that has been essential in shaping culture and 
social relations, the development of indigenous groups over time, and the colonization of 
the region by the Spanish. This history sets the scene for understanding postcolonial 
relations and the making of the current Bolivian nation-state.  
 
Physical Landscape  
The physical landscapes of the Andes and the Amazon have uniquely shaped rich 
indigenous cultures and histories in the region. Because the many indigenous groups 
developed before the making of the current Bolivian nation-state, the current-day national 





Bolivia is a land-locked country in the middle of South America that exists both in the 
Andes mountain range and the Amazon rainforest. Because of its diversity in topography, 
there are distinct climate zones. In the Andes, the altiplano, or high plateau, is a relatively 
flat plateau at about 13,000 feet between the two high Andean ranges (figure 1- pg. 5). 
The western range creates a harsh, mostly uninhabitable barrier between Bolivia and the 
Pacific Ocean (Northern Chile). In contrast, the eastern range contains many river valleys 
and fertile plains, and because it is less steep, it enables easier access to the lowlands. 
Cochabamba is located in the higher altitude plains of the eastern range. 
This unique physical geography of the enclosed altiplano basin creates a distinct 
water system in which the water arrives from snow and ice melt, and leaves through 
evaporation. Flying rivers, or “rivers” of water vapor, enter through a gap in the eastern 
mountains from the Amazon, and bring precipitation that accumulates in glaciers in the 
upper Andes (Forsberg 2016). Water evaporates in the southern altiplano, leaving mineral 
deposits (known as Salar de Uyuni, the world’s largest salt flat) (Forsberg 2016). With 
climate change, the glaciers—which historically did not fluctuate much seasonally due to 
a rainy warm season and a dry cold season—are receding rapidly, and lakes are drying 
up. The second largest lake in Bolivia, Lago Poopó, finally evaporated completely in 
December 2015. Thus, water, which has always been central to Andean cultures and 
existence, is becoming a more contested resource, which helped shape the scene for the 
Water War.  
 
Pre-Spanish Contact 





regions until recently. The region first became inhabited around 21,000 BCE, and small 
communities developed and settled the area. Domestication of plants and animals 
developed and by 2500 BCE, there were agriculture, governments, urban centers, and 
religious centers. In 100 CE, the Tiwanaku cultural empire emerged, based between Lake 
Titicaca and present-day La Paz, and by 600 CE, its influence had spread through 
agriculture and religion to encompass parts of Bolivia, Peru, and Chile (Shanks 2016). 
The Tiwanaku fell in the eleventh century due to a 70-year drought, making room for a 
new empire (Kohl and Farthing 2006, 37) and highlighting the importance of water in the 
area from the beginning. 
Soon, more war-like and aggressive Aymara kingdoms came to dominate the 
area, replacing Tiwanaku centers with fortified towns on hilltops. Within each of seven 
Aymara-speaking groups, there existed ayllus, or kin groupings (Klein 1992). These 
ayllus have been called ‘vertical archipelagos’ due to their non-contiguous territory, and 
this vertical, island-like control “implied the existence of a communal tradition and 
ideology that bound people together in a web of mutual rights and responsibilities” 
(Larson 1988, 21), rather than by a common territory. Because ayllu groups controlled 
non-contiguous territory, this form of organizing created “a multiplicity of societies 
speaking numerous languages [that] were grouped together into a vast non-market 
exchange system which involved a continuous transfer of products among starkly 
different ecological systems” (Klein 1992, 25). These ayllus persisted through Incan 
conquest, Spanish occupation, and the many governments after independence, often 
adapting shape and organization style but maintaining key elements. They remain the 





            In the late fifteenth century, a new group began to emerge in Cusco, and came to 
be known as the Incas. The Incas, one of several Quechua-speaking groups, were able to 
dominate in the 1460s due to the inability of the Aymara kingdoms to unite in resistance. 
Much of Quechua culture today in Bolivia has its roots in the Incan empire, and Quechua 
is currently the second most widespread language in Bolivia (after Spanish, right before 
Aymara). This was partially due to the Quechuanization processes—converting 
languages including Aymara to Quechua by placing Quechua colonists in formerly 
Aymara territories (Klein 1992, 23). Many Inca and other Quechua nations’ traditions 
make up significant parts of Bolivia culture today.  
Despite the strength of the Incas and the cultures of the many nations in the Andes 
regions, the arrival of the Spanish initiated a dramatic reshaping of Bolivia. That the 
indigenous peoples were able to maintain some of their culture and social structures 
(ayllu structure largely persisted in the highlands) throughout colonialism lay the basis 
for the ability not only to craft a successful Water War, but also to create a new way to 
organize contemporary society in the 2000s in the mold of indigenous tradition but with 
recognition and incorporation of elements of the more globalized world of today.  
 
Spanish Contact 
 The Spanish first arrived in the Peruvian Andes in 1532, and the Bolivian 
altiplano in 1538. At this time, the entire region was considered Peru. Spain was 
emerging as a dominant force within Europe, as Europe was becoming a dominant force 
in the world. Due to Spain’s presence (along with Portugal) in the Americas, their new 





Europe and helped prepare the way for its ultimate industrial domination as well” (Klein 
1992, 26). The first wave of Spanish conquest in the 1530s in the greater Andean region 
was characterized by small European armies with superior military technology 
conquering larger indigenous armies as European diseases swept through the region. The 
rhetoric of temporary occupation for gold and silver resources obscured the greater 
project of the Spanish—to establish more permanent colonies and trading posts (Klein 
1992, 32). Further, the Spanish benefitted from the recent Inca conquering pattern, 
because many non-Quechua groups joined the Spanish as allies, in reliance on false 
promises of “recognition of traditional Indian nobilities” (Klein 1992, 31).  
The Spaniards who made the voyage to the Americas were those who could 
afford it but who were not of sufficiently high social status to be satisfied in Spain. The 
influx of only these low groups of the upper nobility class created a “total absence of the 
Spanish peasant class, which was replaced in the New World by the American Indian 
peasants” (Klein 1992, 29). This enabled a small permanent Spanish or criollo class to 
rule over the majority of indigenous peoples. Under Spanish rule, one in every ten native 
men were forced to work in the mines, and as these policies combined with waves of 
European diseases, seventy-five percent of the indigenous population was wiped out in 
forty years (Kohl and Farthing 2006, 38). The remaining indigenous peoples were 
introduced to wage labor, money, taxation, and private property. 
 
Resources and Restructurings 
The Bolivian Altiplano region did not strike the Spaniards’ interest like Cusco had 





establishment of the city of La Paz as a crucial trade hub. Silver production boomed 
during the period between the 1570s and 1650s, making the Upper Peru region one of the 
wealthiest parts of the Spanish-colonized Americas, though the wealth went to the 
Spanish and criollo elites. The extraction of silver initiated what would be a long period 
of exploitation of the region’s natural resources, for purposes benefitting solely those in 
charge. 
As silver boomed, the area became increasingly structured by the Spanish. The 
Toledo Reforms of 1572-1576 under Francisco de Toledo, the first viceroy appointed by 
the Spanish Crown, served to restructure and standardize governments, laws, customs, 
and overall organization of the empire in ways that benefitted the Spanish occupiers. The 
consolidation of sprawling and noncontiguous indigenous settlements was designed to 
create larger cities, and despite strong indigenous fights to continue their ecologically 
differentiated archipelago system, the Toledo structure eventually became the dominant 
form of social organization, relegating ayllu structure primarily to the highlands (Klein 
1992, 39). Toledo also created the city of Cochabamba in 1571 during a new wave of 
Spanish settlements extending into the lower Cordillera Real regions. The Cochabamba 
region became intimately tied economically to Potosí, engaging in trade of wheat and 
maize for silver.  
Throughout the 1600s and 1700s, the lower altiplano area, including Cochabamba 
and Potosí, experienced several booms in silver production, with more mines opening up 
in the greater region. Under the Bourbon reforms instituted by Spain in the 1770s, the 
greater Peru area was split, with the lower half, including Cochabamba, Potosí, and parts 





productive and economically vibrant regions from Lima and Cusco. This top-down 
structure, like most, further oppressed the indigenous populations, and despite the 
temporarily successful, multi-group Tupac Amaru Rebellion from 1780-1782 that 
destabilized the Spanish, they ultimately retained control.  
During this time, Spain’s relations in Europe were tenuous, particularly due to 
invasions by the English (1796) and French (1808). Trade routes to the Americas slowed 
as Spain had to devote resources to its own survival, and “the sudden collapse of the 
international trade routes created a temporary but quite severe depression in commercial 
markets” (Klein 1992, 85), particularly for Southern Andean natural resources. Because 
the Andean region had become embedded in the world economy, the region’s economic 
standing was at least partially dependent on the state of Europe’s economies, signifying 
the beginning of economic dependency. 
Seeds of Independence 
In the decades before and during this period of Andean depression, independence 
movements around the world began to inspire those who had been oppressed by white, 
often distant, elites, and began to generate fear of social revolutions in those elites who 
would resist such change. In 1808, local elites in La Paz became the first to declare 
independence from Spain, and this declaration instigated the period of American Wars of 
Independence from 1808 to 1825. While La Paz didn’t gain independence at this time, the 
wars inspired many fights throughout South America (Klein 1992). 
By 1816, Simón Bolívar was advocating for independence in Venezuela, and 
Argentina was declaring independence as well. Bolívar hoped to unify the continent 





conflict between Upper Peru and his Colombian state, both of which he had helped to 
create, he had to rethink. He was “beginning to fear the growth of too powerful a 
Peruvian Republic which in turn could threaten the existence and importance of his own 
base in Gran Colombia” and due to hostility in Argentina, “all his plans made the idea of 
a buffer state between Peru and Argentina a reasonable proposition” (Klein 1992, 98). 
Finally, in 1824 the last royalist army was defeated in Lower Peru. In 1825, Upper Peru 
was liberated from Spain, and Bolivian Independence was declared on August 6th, 1825, 
with the country named after Bolívar.  
 
Conclusion 
When the Spanish first arrived in the Andes, they immediately colonized the 
natural resources as well as the space. As with all colonizers, Europeans in the Andes 
believed themselves to be superior to the indigenous populations. They justified their 
exploitative processes of silver extraction and settlement by arguing that the local 
populations’ failure to take advantage of the riches entitled them to do so. This created an 
expectation of Bolivia’s resources as inherently exploitable and exportable for profit. 
This was the beginning of the process of the internationalization of Bolivia’s nature and 
space, and of the long history of struggle with international actors. These processes 
would continue into independence, and because criollo elites came to power 
immediately, Bolivia’s indigenous populations were never consulted, as the criollos and 
their series of international allies dominated the decision-making. Thus, for the majority 
indigenous populations, the next period of “independence” effectively mirrored the 







Postcolonialism: The World Bank, The Bolivian Government, and The 
Making of the Modern World to 1980 
  
At the time of Bolivian independence in 1825, the criollo elites dominated 
decision-making, influenced by economic ties to the globalizing economy and the 
political desires of powerful countries. Barbara Stallings (1992) explores this pattern of 
local elites’ connections to powerful countries in the global context, describing a 
“historical-structural” approach to dependency analysis that emerged from Latin 
American social scientists. This approach “focused not on direct links between center and 
periphery but on intermediaries, specifically groups in Latin America who shared 
interests with the international actors and thus joined forces with them to promote mutual 
gain often at the expense of other national groups” (Stallings 1992, 45). This historical-
structural dependency theory also acknowledges diversity in the nature of relationships 
between countries in Latin America and the international economy, due to different 
stages of growth and different socioeconomic and political contexts (Stallings 1992, 45). 
Using this theory helps to illuminate the role the Bolivian government had as an 
intermediary, while also recognizing that the relationship between the Bolivian state and 
the international actors was constantly in flux due to raw resource supply and demand, 
international economic growth and depression, the actors themselves, and myriad other 
influences.  
Bolivia’s increasing dependence on outside actors mirrored global development 
patterns in which first world countries became dependent on third world raw resources, 





market. These patterns developed along colonial lines, so while colonialism had “ended,” 
its reach took different forms. While this is overly simplified, the general patterns of 
global development help to illuminate the making of countries of the third world into 
internationalized spaces. Much of this development in the later 1900s was driven by the 
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and large multinational 
corporations, all of which were influenced by the United States and other powerful 
governments.  
This chapter explores Bolivia’s complex and significant relationship with the 
dominant colonial and neocolonial powers of Western Europe and the United States in 
the structuring of the Bolivian country. The disparity between the Bolivian state leaders 
and the majority populations highlights the actors within Bolivia who worked with 
international elites, often to the benefit of those international groups. This chapter also 
looks at how, in postcolonial times, the larger global picture of international aid, and in 
particular, the development of the World Bank and the IMF also played a pivotal role in 
structuring the global economy. The emergence of the World Bank and the IMF as 
prominent economic actors in the 1950s and 1960s, and the Bank’s production of much 
of the literature surrounding development aid, form the foundation for the global context 
that led to the Water War. Through this lens of postcolonialism, the continued existence 
of colonial-like relations in Bolivia under different actors continues.  
 
Bolivian Independence and Economic Struggle 
At the time of independence, “to the rest of the world, Bolivia was still a mythical 





treasure house of riches,” but for Bolivians, it “was a war-weary and economically 
depressed region which was to experience, in the first years of its life, an economic 
stagnation which lasted for close to half a century” (Klein 1992, 101). Historians often 
argue that independence for Bolivia was economically detrimental to the country, and 
that they simply were not ready for it (Klein 1992, 101). The sixteen-year war against 
Spain was not fought cohesively or with one vision of independence in mind, and the 
region of new Bolivia was not bound together by anything more than arbitrary borders 
configured by Bolívar and the elites, who saw opportunity for personal gain in the 
creation of the state. These criollos “had little grasp of the geopolitical problems that 
forming a highly dispersed, weakly consolidated state would engender” (Kohl and 
Farthing 2006, 40), and Bolivians have struggled ever since to create a shared national 
identity and a strong state across starkly different ethnic, geographic, and sociopolitical 
divisions.  
With struggling national elites and dispersed indigenous populations, the new 
country became increasingly vulnerable to international influence. The newly 
independent state remained under traditional elite control, but economic hardship in its 
early years caused many Spanish-speaking populations in the cities and in haciendas to 
move to other developing countries. The exodus of urban elites and those of Spanish 
descent, combined with the decline of the mines, left the country dominated by rural, 
subsistence settlements. This “decline of the export sector reduced the level of Spanish 
exploitation and raised the income of the Indian peasants” (Klein 1992, 105), as internal 
trade picked up and the government became increasingly dependent on the indigenous 





remained dominated by criollos, the vast majority of the population was indigenous, 
unlike in some other Latin American countries, most notably Chile and Argentina, where 
there existed a stronger middle class of criollos or mestizos.  
Throughout its first 100 years, Bolivia worked to establish itself as an 
independent country, nationalizing the Roman Catholic Church, continuing to attempt to 
increase silver production, and fighting in several wars that shrunk and solidified its 
borders. These included severance of political involvement with Peru and coastal defeat 
to Chile during the War of the Pacific (1879-1883), as well as loss of the Acre territory to 
Brazil (1903). During this time, various Spanish-descent or mestizo political figures, 
groups, and projects competed for dominance. Many of the rulers had lived abroad in 
Europe at some point in their lives, and brought relatively European viewpoints to state 
governance. Foreign trade increased with the discovery of guano, more silver, nitrates, 
and tin in the late 1800s and early 1900s, and Bolivia became increasingly economically 
dependent on exports of these raw materials. 
By the early 1900s, during a global movement to increase infrastructure and 
introduce transportation technologies, Bolivia received a United States private bank loan 
to help complete international rail connections that helped facilitate trade. Under Bautista 
Saavedra who took over in 1921, banking controversies emerged involving large U.S. 
loans for infrastructure in return for U.S. control over Bolivia’s taxation. The desire to 
further integrate Bolivia into the world economy through infrastructure development 
increased even more with the beginning of oil extraction in the Chaco territory (in what is 
today Paraguay- see figure 1). In 1921, Standard Oil Company of New Jersey purchased 





neocolonialism, based on privatization and extraction of Bolivia’s hydrocarbon 
resources” (Hindery 2013, 22). Already wary of international presence dictating resource 
extraction and trade, opposition quickly surfaced.  
 
A Shift Toward the Left 
In 1930, in response to increasing U.S. control over Bolivia’s infrastructure, trade, 
and resources at a time of global depression, radical leftism began to arise, as Marxist 
radicals attempted to lead a worker-peasant uprising in “the first genuinely successful 
expression of more radical political activity on the national political front” (Klein 1992, 
177). Soon after, in 1932, the Chaco War started over the oil-rich territory. After their 
defeat, Bolivia created the state oil company Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales 
Bolivianos (YPFB) in 1936, and nationalized the industry the next year (Hindery 2013, 
22). This provoked negative U.S. reaction, and the United States sanctioned mineral 
imports and threatened to discourage investment in Bolivia if the government did not pay 
Standard Oil back for the expulsion (Hindery 2013, 23). These U.S. sanctions catalyzed a 
long struggle over control of Bolivia’s oil reserves between the Bolivian state and foreign 
private oil companies (backed significantly by the United States or other governments), 
reintroducing questions of sovereignty of the Bolivian state versus international actors, 
and influence of the Bolivian majority versus the state.   
Defeat in the war over Chaco territory oil reserves between Bolivia and Paraguay 
also led to the collapse of the civilian government and the rise of the “Chaco generation” 
(Kohl and Farthing 2006, 45). These university students—children of government 





“the Indian question, the labor question, the land question, and the economic dependency 
on private miners” (Klein 1992, 186). This leftist Marxism had its roots in European 
thought, and tended to focus more on labor issues than indigenous issues. The Chaco War 
left Bolivia in the same economic state, but politically, “it changed from being one of the 
least mobilized societies in Latin America, in terms of radical ideology and union 
organization, to one of the most advanced” (Klein 1992, 187). This shift, along with the 
rise of the Chaco generation—and the creation of the Movimiento Nacionalista 
Revolucionario (MNR) Party in 1942—led to the revolution of 1952. With the arming of 
many of the supporters of the MNR, including rural indigenous masses, the National 
Revolution of 1952 culminated in the MNR coming into power.  
The MNR wanted to transform Bolivia into a modern and centralized state, with 
all natural resource ownership nationalized. With pressure from indigenous and working-
class peoples, the MNR gave everyone citizenship and the right to vote, and attempted to 
establish national education and healthcare systems, though the state lacked the resources 
to effectively administer those (Kohl and Farthing 2006, 47). Despite social progress, 
during the next 12 years Bolivia faced a “bankrupt economy, an inability of the regime 
even to feed its people, and a lack of capital to undertake all the ambitious welfare and 
reform programs proposed” (Klein 1992, 238), and soon hyperinflation began. The 
government began to seek assistance from the United States and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). 
 
The IMF and the World Bank 





Bretton Woods Conference in 1944 at the end of World War II. The IMF was created as a 
financial and exchange rate stabilizer, while the World Bank was created as a 
development bank “to promote economic and social progress in developing countries by 
helping to raise productivity so that their people may live a better and fuller life” 
(Driscoll 1996). Both institutions are headquartered in Washington DC, and although 
their work differs, they work together to stabilize, develop, and aid national economies 
worldwide. Despite seemingly apolitical and benevolent motives, the two institutions 
have faced significant opposition throughout their existence, and in many cases, their 
work has actually created new problems. Because they act as globalizers, working to 
incorporate more countries into the world economy—using economic theory that is often 
not directly applicable or relevant—the countries that receive aid become more 
dependent on the global economy. Furthermore, the United States and other major 
countries have significant political influence over the two institutions, since they created 
them and largely run them. The two institutions have largely shaped the world economy 
based on economic and political principles dictated by the United States and other 
Northern governments, implementing top-down policies and structural adjustment 
programs (Woods 2006). Both the IMF and the World Bank began to play significant 
roles in the structuring of Bolivia throughout the country’s next period. 
 
Economic Aid in Bolivia 
By 1956, Bolivia under the MNR was in need of outside help to control 
hyperinflation and to address widespread famine. Through a much-needed bailout and 





restructuring that brought “the most conservative, pro-business sectors in the MNR to the 
fore, sharpening the divide between the government and the labour movement” (Kohl and 
Farthing 2006, 49). The restructuring efforts included pressure for a free-market 
economy, privatization and stabilization of the government, and more, with threatened 
discontinuation of aid if Bolivia did not comply (Zunes 2001).  
IMF economic aid was joined by 5 million dollars of necessary food aid from the 
United States, under the condition that Bolivia would ramp up its military. In 1956, 
Bolivia passed a new law at the imperative of the U.S. government that “enabled foreign 
investments in hydrocarbon and forbade state companies from extracting Bolivian oil” 
(Hindery 2013, 24), despite widespread protests. While the oil investment law was for 
U.S. economic reasons, the U.S. food aid was for entirely ideological reasons, as the 
United States wanted to quell any possibility of a communist revolution in Bolivia. As 
Zunes describes it, the United States was willing to work with the Bolivian revolution 
due to the “realization that it might be able to moderate [it] because of Bolivia's extreme 
economic dependency and take the opportunity to manipulate the balance of forces within 
the factionalized MNR to its own advantage” (Zunes 2001, 34). This established a 
precedent of ideological control through economic means.  
By the end of the 1950s, Bolivia became the first Latin American country and the 
largest single recipient of U.S. foreign aid, and worldwide, it became the highest per-
capita recipient of foreign aid. Because of Bolivian dependence on the United States, and 
because of the U.S. control of the IMF, these aid programs essentially “gave the U.S. 
government unprecedented power to control the course of the Bolivian revolution” 





process following the revolution because of the dire situation within the country, and 
because “the MNR’s pragmatic wing recognized that no Bolivian revolution could afford 
to alienate the United States, not just because of the threat of direct intervention but also 
because of the possibility of economic retaliation, not unimportant given Bolivia's 
dependence on the United States to absorb its tin and provide needed imports” (Zunes 
2001, 35). This demonstrates the power of economic aid; while Bolivia initially needed 
food to feed its people, food aid became a vehicle for the United States to secure political 
and economic control over a country (and its resources) that, had its course of history 
gone differently, could have become another radical enemy of the United States.  
 
Political Turbulence 
 The United States continued to have considerable influence in Bolivia until 1970, 
when the military instituted General Juan José Torres as president. Torres, a radical 
leftist, began to accept financial aid from Russia and Eastern Europe, thus rendering U.S. 
aid uncritical. Over the next few decades, Bolivia’s leadership overturned many times. 
Conservative Hugo Banzer, president-dictator from 1971-1978, restructured Bolivia and 
made many economic gains while also working to depoliticize and re-educate the masses 
(Klein 1992, 256). He abolished all political parties and instituted a military rule in 1974, 
in the model of the Pinochet regime in Chile (Klein 1992, 258). During this period of 
conservative military rule, literacy rose from 31% to 67% (from 1950 to 1976); Spanish 
was becoming the majority language for the first time in Bolivian history, now spoken by 
72% of the population (Klein 1992, 265). 





diversifying economically and politically. Bolivia’s trade partners diversified to include 
Latin American countries and Asia, a significant departure from the 1960s when the 
United States and Western Europe took 90-95% of the exports (Klein 1992, 260). This 
diversification insured that one country was not controlling Bolivia economically or 
ideologically. Within Bolivia, many different political parties began to re-emerge, 
creating a diversity of political opinion and ideology, as democratic elections were 
reinstated. Despite the nominal democracy, eight separate governments ruled between 
1978 and 1982, during a period of extreme political and civil upheaval (Kohl and 
Farthing 2006, 54).  
 By the 1980s, coca leaves for cocaine were becoming a significant export. Bolivia 
was still dependent on and in debt from loans, particularly those for modernizing 
agriculture, and as cocaine boomed internationally, coca leaves from the lowlands grew 
in demand. Coca growing in the Chapare region dates to pre-colonial times, because the 
coca leaves are used spiritually and help with altitude in the altiplano, but the exports 
increased significantly with the production of cocaine. Despite growing exports and 
profits from cocaine, other industry did not grow. Bolivia remained one of the poorest 
countries in Latin America throughout the 1980s and 1990s, and today is the single 
poorest country in South America by GDP per capita (aneki.com). Agriculture is still a 
predominant sector, with only 51% of people living in cities by 1988.  
 
The World Bank and IMF in the 1980s 
 During the Bolivian political instability from the 1960s to the 1980s, the country 





urban development and infrastructure projects, water supply projects, mining and gas 
projects, financial management projects, and more. To see a full list of World Bank 
projects in Bolivia through 1989, see appendix table 1. See appendix table 2 for World 
Bank projects in Bolivia from 1990 to 2000.  
These World Bank development projects were not occurring uniquely in Bolivia, 
but rather were part of a wave of globalization driven by the World Bank and the IMF 
and their leaders. As president of the Bank, former U.S. secretary of defense Robert 
McNamara argued fervently that “rich countries had the responsibility to redistribute 
their wealth to the poorer countries, for moral and ethical reasons, as well as the more 
pragmatic reason of stemming the tide of revolution” (Goldman 2005, 73) that was 
growing worldwide in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Sparking new academic studies on 
development economics, poverty, and the Green Revolution, the World Bank in this era 
became more than just a development bank; it became a new driver of organizing and 
constructing transnational relations, from education to infrastructure to agriculture to the 
perpetuation of economic dependency in the name of ‘development’.  
 Despite the development and poverty-reduction motives of the Bank throughout 
the global South in the 1970s, “the twin effects of massive borrowing for rural 
industrialization and the linking of Southern food and agricultural sectors to the 
consumption of Northern-based capital goods and farm inputs, contributed heavily to the 
net flow of capital out of the South and into the North” (Goldman 2005, 88). Between 
1976 and 1980, the South’s debt had grown by 20% annually due to the Bank’s loans. 
Entering the 1980s, the global South was generally struggling again with inflation, debt, 





market-oriented reforms, was a combination of debt service, stabilization, and structural 
adjustment (Stallings 1992, 44).  
These three policy clusters dominated development rhetoric over the next decade, 
and set the stage for the dominance of neoliberalism in the 1990s. Debt service is 
mediated through relations with private banks, bilateral creditors, and multilateral 
agencies; stabilization involves policies to address inflation and balance of payments; 
structural adjustment includes many policies of institution building, specifically 
liberalization and privatization (Stallings 1992, 44). 
Stallings highlights the mechanisms through which these programs operate. The 
first is the integration of countries into international markets that determine terms of 
trade by international demand. The second is economic, political, and ideological linkage 
between domestic groups and international actors. The third is through leverage that uses 
the power relations between international actors and 3rd world governments (Stallings 
1992, 48-49). These mechanisms are not new to the 1980s; they have been developing 
along postcolonial lines, in both Bolivia and globally, since independence. Using these 
mechanisms, the World Bank and the IMF implemented new projects with conditions and 
requirements that resulted in many countries having to reduce their spending on national 
social welfare (food subsidies, health, education, etc.) in order to meet the demands of the 
World Bank and the IMF. By 1986, third world debt was at $1 trillion, much of which 
was to pay interest on old loans, further increasing dependency on loans from the Bank 







Through the mechanisms of international markets, linkage, and leverage, 
international actors have increased accessibility and exploitability of Bolivia’s resources, 
and therefore its nature and space. Because Bolivia had to depend on these international 
actors, primarily the IMF and the United States, to stabilize inflation and receive food 
aid, and because the United States and other large economies desired Bolivia’s natural 
resources, Bolivia was forced deeper into neocolonial relationships. These relationships 
were supported by the Bolivian state to varying degrees, but the majority of working-
class people, young people, and indigenous peoples were growing increasingly angry 
about international actors controlling and dictating Bolivia’s economy, politics, and life. 
These tensions would only increase in the 1990s, as privatization efforts increased and 









Neoliberalism: Setting the Stage for the Water War 
Cycles of privatization and nationalization of various industries in Bolivia 
occurred throughout the 1900s. Oil, as a key example, oscillated between state control 
and international private control many times following its discovery in the early 1900s. 
Other industries like gas and tin have also been through cycles of privatization and state 
control. In the 1970s and 1980s, with the advent of neoliberalism, privatization became 
the worldwide trend. Private corporations based in the United States and other major 
countries were gaining unprecedented access to natural resources in Latin America. This 
tide of neoliberalism was driven by the World Bank and the IMF, with influence from the 
United States and other governments, which, starting in the 1950s and 1960s, were 
becoming increasingly influenced by private corporations. Though institutional links 
between private corporations and Latin American privatization may be indirect, the 
murky role of these corporations in the U.S. government, and of the U.S. government in 
the World Bank suggest that the corporations played a role in increasing privatization.  
 The neoliberalism of the 1980s and 1990s was next in a long series of neocolonial 
relationships that continue to put outside actors in control of Bolivia’s natural resources. 
While the internationalization of Bolivia’s space continues to take new forms, and the 
actors continue to change, the people of Bolivia are still faced with the violence, 
frustration, and exploitation of having powerful outside groups control their resources. 
These outside groups do not understand the local context, and often care more about 
making money or achieving political and economic motives than about truly restructuring 





poverty,” such as the World Bank, do so insufficiently, paternalistically, and generically.   
This chapter looks at the rise of neoliberalism through the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund, the shift to a more “green” version of neoliberalism, and 
the role of the different actors in the privatization decision of 1999. Many people in 
Bolivia protested privatization every step of the way, but, as is the case in many 
internationalized spaces, the international actors have too much leverage, their linkage 
with state elites is too strong, and the states are too embedded in international markets for 
the protests to permanently dispel privatization. So the privatization spread from industry 
to industry, reaching the water in Cochabamba in 1999. When it reached the water, so 
crucial to daily survival, the people had had enough. 
 
Rise of Neoliberalism  
Neoliberalism, and the implementation of its ideals, arose in the 1970s and 1980s, 
and is often considered to be tied to the rise of Reaganomics during the Reagan years. 
David Harvey (2007) argues that the first implementation of a neoliberal state as we 
understand it today was in Chile in 1973, after Pinochet’s coup. The coup, supported by 
the United States—with intelligence help from the corporation Bechtel, the same 
corporation that privatized Cochabamba’s water in 1999—was enacted to repress social 
movements of socialism, to reduce market restrictions, and to revive the economy. The 
subsequent government restructuring, formulated by the “Chicago boys” (Pinochet 
economists trained at the University of Chicago), was funded by loans from the IMF. 
With help from the IMF, the economists “reversed the nationalizations and privatized 





many cases riding roughshod over the claims of indigenous inhabitants), privatized social 
security, and facilitated foreign direct investments and freer trade” (Harvey 2007, 8). This 
first case study—in the global periphery rather than the core, as Harvey notes—became 
the model for neoliberal agendas of privatization, deregulation, “trickle-down” 
economics, reduced trade barriers, free trade, and reduced government spending. 
Neoliberal models proliferated throughout the world, mirroring the policies of Reagan 
and Britain’s Margaret Thatcher. 
Neoliberalism and structural adjustment were introduced in Bolivia in 1985 under 
President Victor Pas Estenssoro, with the edict known as DS 21060 or the NEP (New 
Economic Policy), designed to control hyperinflation. While it was successful in 
achieving that goal, it also destroyed unions, lowered living standards, and started 
processes of privatization. Mining unions prior to 1985 were strong and influential for the 
Bolivian economy and politics, but the collapse of tin prices, combined with DS 21060 in 
1985, threatened the unions. A protest march from Cochabamba to La Paz in 1986 was 
stopped by the military, and resulted in the privatization of the mines and the effective 
end of the unions. Through corporate globalization, resources became even more 
exploited, pay rates stagnated, and prices increased for services such as health care, 
education, and electricity. Feeling the effects of exploitation, repression of protest, and 
more expensive services, the people were increasingly dissatisfied, both with neoliberal 
policies generally and with the institutions that were initiating them. Protests began 







Shift from Neoliberalism to Green Neoliberalism 
 In the late 1980s, protests against neoliberalism proliferated in the third world; 
“the image in the North of the happy recipients of Bank aid—the ‘objects of 
development’—was sabotaged as rural peasants and urban laborers began a series of 
bread riots and project protests, including mass marches and fasts to dramatize their 
discontent with the World Bank and its policies” (Goldman 2005, 94). Social and 
environmental concerns were raised worldwide, and many of the Bank’s policies and 
projects came under scrutiny. Protestors challenged development as both socially and 
environmentally destructive, and many people lost faith in the World Bank.  
With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 came worldwide unrest, as 
“‘ethnic, religious, and territorial conflicts, long subdued by the Cold War, erupted one 
after another. The world was remade, tossed, and liberated—and reopened for 
international business’” (Steve Coll in Denton, 209). The World Bank responded (after a 
brief period of denial) with massive reorganization, arguing that “there could be no 
sustained economic growth without a sustainable environment and just treatment of the 
ethnic minorities and indigenous peoples living on fragile ecosystems” (Goldman 96-97). 
They implemented environmental policies and ordered reports and research, requiring all 
projects from 1995 on to have environmental and social impact reports. This response 
represented a rapid departure from previous development protocol, and came along with 
the rising tide of a new kind of neoliberalism—green neoliberalism.  
 Green neoliberalism, the Bank’s response to integrate more environmentally and 
socially “conscious” goals, “fundamentally altered the defining features of the Bank’s 





society relations that exist as uncommodified or underutilized by capital markets” 
(Goldman 2005, 7). Essentially, under this new form of neoliberalism, the World Bank 
marketed the idea that natural resources like water and forests were being improperly and 
inefficiently managed by Third World governments, and that, in order to work toward 
environmental sustainability, these markets must be privatized and commodified. As 
Goldman argues, this current of neoliberalism was “built upon the power relations 
embedded and embodied in former colonial capitalist relations,” and works to completely 
“remake nature in the South” to prioritize commercial logging, cash-cropping, 
preservation, and elite eco-tourism (Goldman 2005, 8-9). While much of this new 
neoliberalism was driven by the World Bank, it began to pervade global development 
discourse, as Northern environmentalists came together with neoliberal economists, and 
national elites as well as international actors implemented these new policies under the 
guise of protecting natural resources from the incapable poor countries of the South.  
In Bolivia during this massive shift toward “environmentally-friendly” 
privatization between 1985 and 1999, the country’s debt rose by about 3 billion dollars 
(Olivera 2004, 15). In 1997, the former dictator Hugo Banzer returned to power after 14 
years, and job loss increased drastically, leading to a huge surplus of unemployed 
workers working under inhumane conditions out of desperation, with no promise of job 
security. More transnational companies moved into Bolivia to take over newly privatized 
industries, and corruption in government increased. Olivera noted that “this impunity—so 
characteristic of neoliberalism itself—clearly demonstrated that the ideological basis, as 
well as the roots, of corruption existed within the system” (Olivera 2004, 17).  





neoliberalism. They had no other recourse to silence the hungry, protect the political and 
economic elite, or to control the population” (Olivera 2004, 18). Labor organization and 
social protest became increasingly criminalized, and the police gained power. Democracy 
became simply a name for holding corrupt elections, and while political candidates often 
ran on platforms of creating jobs and reducing poverty; “at the end of the day, however, 
their strategy for eliminating poverty is to eliminate the poor” (Olivera 2004, 21). Thus, 
the poor became increasingly oppressed, silenced, and dispossessed of their jobs, welfare, 
and resources, while the political elite gained power. All of this began to set the stage for 
the water privatization law of 1999.  
 
Water System Management and Law 2029 
While neoliberalism ravaged indigenous and poor populations across the Global 
South, growing populations and the rhetoric of climate change refocused the conversation 
on diminishing water resources and ineptitude of local states to effectively distribute 
potable water to their populations. Goldman argues that, “since the mid-1990s, a new 
transnational policy network has arisen with the ambition of generating a global policy 
agenda on water” (Goldman 2005, 224). This new agenda had many goals, including 
improving access to water for the poor and finding the right price of water to enable 
access while restricting overuse. Through the process of normalizing and depoliticizing 
water privatization narratives, “the World Bank successfully transformed a ‘potentially 
explosive political question about rights, entitlements, how one should live, and who 
should decide into technical questions of efficiency and sustainability’” (Li 2002, 1 in 





academically by the World Bank Institute (WBI) (previously Economic Development 
Institute prior to the late 1990s), a worldwide training program sponsored by the World 
Bank that trains professionals and produces studies and knowledge that will benefit the 
World Bank. 
The World Bank began to require a privatized water system as a precondition to 
receiving Bank loans, resulting in “industry analysts predict[ing] that private water will 
soon be a capitalized market as precious, and as war-provoking, as oil” (Goldman 2005, 
232). This rapid shift from nationalized industries often beneficial to the countries to 
privatization occurred as structural adjustment impositions and transnational policy 
networks spread, with help from the creation of the World Water Council in 1996. The 
transnational water policy network included many multinational corporations, and 
various reports depicted water privatization as both lucrative for the company and 
beneficial in reducing the number of people without access to potable water.  
Goldman argues that “there is good reason to critically question the ‘global water 
scarcity’ and the ‘crisis’ discourses of the transnational water policy network and to 
examine the very real political-economic interests that lie behind it” (Goldman 2005, 
252), because these narratives emerged out of particular powerful agents embedded in the 
global water industry. While many people lack access to potable water, it is not 
necessarily due to a global water shortage or the exploitation of water resources by small-
scale communities. Rather, these shortages result from two decades of structural 
adjustment policies driven by the World Bank that emphasized decreasing spending on 
public utilities, infrastructure, and services (Goldman 2005, 251), and from decades of 





money-making schemes over the majority populations.  
  Despite the constructed historical, socio-political and geographic dimensions of 
water shortages, the effects are very real, and in Cochabamba in the late 1990s, the water 
situation was dire. Water shortages are not new in Cochabamba, and Olivera notes that 
Bolivia’s “water shortages have been historically used by politicians and businesspeople 
to manipulate the population in pursuit of corporate interests and corporate power” 
(Olivera 2004, 8). The case in 1999 was no different. 
In June of 1999, the World Bank released a report on Bolivia that specifically 
focused on the Cochabamba water situation. In keeping with recent policy to enforce 
privatization by threatening to discontinue loans until public utilities were privatized, the 
World Bank strongly recommended the privatization of the Cochabamba water system. In 
October 1999, in response to the World Bank report, the Bolivian Government introduced 
Water Law 2029 to govern water. The law set national standards for drinking water, and 
in doing so, discontinued the guarantee of water distribution to rural areas, prohibited 
traditional water practices and distribution systems (without compensation for systems 
that had been built by individuals and communities), “dollarized” all water payments 
(meaning the prices now depended on exchange rates and how strong the boliviano was 
to the US dollar), and even prohibited the collection of rainwater without explicit 
permission (Kohl and Farthing 2006, 162-163; Olivera 2004, 9).   
Before Law 2029 passed, a contract was signed between the Bolivian government 
and Aguas de Tunari, a new consortium that would own and operate the water system in 
Cochabamba for the next forty years. Aguas de Tunari was mostly held by the San-





of Spain and four Bolivian companies, including one led by the owner of Bolivia’s 
Burger Kings, and one led by the Movimiento Izquerdia Revolucionaria (MIR or 
Movement of the Revolutionary Left), which, ironically, is neither left nor revolutionary 
(Olivera 2004, 10). The consortium was the only bidder of the privatization effort, so 
despite being improperly qualified and poorly motivated, the government had no other 
options. So they turned to the multinational corporation Bechtel, and their partners. 
 
Who is Bechtel? 
Bechtel is a large, private construction and engineering corporation based in San 
Francisco, California. Bechtel is responsible for 25,000 projects across all seven 
continents and 160 countries spanning over a century of hard work (Bechtel.com). What 
started as an honest, hardworking, all-American company became a multinational 
corporation tied deeply to oil, politics, foreign policy, big money, power, and corruption, 
aiming to build the world in a way that favored Bechtel and its friends.  
Bechtel began with construction and infrastructure projects on the West coast of 
the United States, including many roads, railroads, bridges, and dams, the largest being 
the Hoover Dam. Over the years, Bechtel’s projects expanded to include pipelines, 
refineries, ships for WWII, nuclear power plants, international airports, entire cities, 
resource extraction sites, and privatization projects. 
More significantly, and more controversially, the company developed close 
relations to the U.S. government. Bechtel played a large part in intelligence-gathering for 
the CIA from the 1950s onward, particularly in the Middle East. Through close 





as Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State under Reagan, and many private lobbyists 
in Washington, Bechtel and the U.S. Government epitomize the “revolving door” 
between private corporations and the government. This relationship has won Bechtel 
many business deals, helped dictate which countries become allies of the U.S. (driven 
largely by oil or other resources), and even helped drive several U.S.-backed coups d’état 
and other foreign policy decisions (McCartney 1989; Denton 2016).  
However, as a New York Times article pointed out in 1988, “despite the grandeur 
and high visibility of many of its projects, […] Bechtel has sought to keep a low profile” 
(Labaton 1988), choosing to be known by its key customers rather than by the public. 
While Bechtel has been cited as the company that “built the American West” and 
“engineered the world,” it is not a commonly known household name, and not by 
accident. Bechtel often takes on projects as part of consortiums or through other local 
companies (often companies it has created), so as to avoid having its name on the project. 
They dodge responsibility on controversial projects by saying they are “just the 
engineers” of projects, not the designers or masterminds behind them, but they enjoy the 
immense power they have as one of the largest, longest-standing, and most global private 
corporations over the last 120 years. So why did such a well-established, far-reaching, 
massive corporation come to Cochabamba?  
Bechtel is always looking for new industries, and water privatization at this time 
was the next big thing. As CEO Stephen Bechtel said, “we’re more about making money 
than making things” (Dangl 2007, 61). While the company did not have a history of 
water system management, they saw an opportunity to make some money off the 40-year 





industries and utilizing their impressive engineering skills to make it work. But because 
of their disregard for the local people, and their misunderstanding of the local context, 
they quickly faced significant opposition.  
Aguas de Tunari, with the help of Bechtel, set the rates for the water, and also 
controlled the water bills, which fraudulently included increases in water consumption 
amounts. Some water bills increased by as much as 300%, which many Cochabambinos 
simply could no longer pay. More importantly, these policies went against all of their 
beliefs, including water as a right, water as a public service rather than a business, water 
distribution as taking into account the needs of the people, and water system innovation 
as within the purview of neighborhood cooperatives and rural communities. As Olivera 
notes, the privatization decision had to do with “the nature of government decision-
making. Would decisions be made by taking into consideration the interests of the 
population, or simply by conforming to what foreign financial entities prescribed?” 
(Olivera 2004, 11). It was this thinking that jumpstarted the resistance.  
 
Conclusions 
Neoliberalism and green neoliberalism arose from the search for new solutions to 
global poverty and resource overuse, but were also embedded deeply in the colonial 
relations that have developed over centuries. Despite stated motives of reducing poverty 
and increasing development, or sustainable resource management and welfare 
distribution, projects driven by colonial histories and instituted without the input of those 
whose lives they will affect will be violent and damaging to the people they are 





Bank, the Bolivian Government and Bechtel collaborated to address the water shortage in 
Cochabamba without the direct input of Cochabambinos.  
Though different in scope, action and effect, Bechtel and the World Bank have 
actually changed the world in very similar ways—they facilitated close U.S. government 
relations with international development aid, foreign governments, and Northern 
corporations, and they helped to construct economic dependency cycles and a globalized 
economy that relies on the raw materials from countries in the Middle East and the 
Global South while relying on the technical expertise and manufactured goods of the 
Global North, particularly the United States. The distinction between the World Bank, the 
U.S. government, and multinational corporations like Bechtel has become murkier, as 
governments have increasingly advocated for and enforced privatization policies. 
Because of the internationalization of Bolivia and the linking of the Bolivian state to 
foreign actors, the Bolivian state does not sufficiently stand as an intermediary between 
the people of Bolivia and the complex web of international influences. 
As Woods argues, “the greatest success of the IMF and the World Bank has been 
as globalizers. […] Politics and their own rules and habits explain much of why they have 
presented globalization as a solution to challenges they have faced in the world economy" 
(Woods 2006, 2-3). By making these claims, Woods is not arguing that the World Bank 
and the IMF act as solitary actors, but instead that they have become deeply entrenched in 
the world economic system with the help of the powerful governments and economists 
who created the institutions. However, as people began to uncover and expose the 
downfalls and false promises of neoliberal development—particularly when its effects 





Chapter 5  
Decoloniality: The Water War 
Looking at Bolivia in its period after independence through a postcolonial lens 
illuminates the continuing multi-scalar power dynamics present in the country. While the 
actors have changed—and the economic and development mechanisms have shifted—the 
results have been relatively the same throughout its history. Bolivia as an 
internationalized space has been opened up to outside actors who then profit off of 
Bolivia’s nature, while the majority of people living in Bolivia have limited autonomy 
over their resources and living conditions. When the cycle of exploitation reached 
Cochabamba’s water system, however, the people initiated a social movement laden with 
decolonial modes of thinking and decolonial assertions for living in order to take back 
their water system management and their resources. 
 
The Backdrop 
Since the time of initial European contact, many indigenous groups in Bolivia 
resisted and maintained their own heterogeneous structures of organizing and living, 
despite oppressive and often violent pressure from the colonizers and, later, state actors. 
Because these structures remained in the fabric of the Andes, efforts to build a movement 
that utilized this historical multiplicity centered on solidarity between indigenous peoples 
and other campesinos. Because of the wide range of people who were both affected by 
and indignant at foreign corporate control of the city’s water system, “the Cochabamba 
Water War was the most heated example of the Bolivian people’s broad-based opposition 





defeats” (Assies 2010, 57). The collective action against neoliberalism was so strong 
because it mobilized against Bechtel, a common enemy, and around water, a common 
necessity. 
 
Andean Water Systems and Cultural Identities 
The cultural identities of indigenous groups and campesino groups in the Andes 
have been tied to water and irrigation systems throughout colonial and postcolonial times. 
Because water is often scarce due to the physical geography described earlier and the 
unpredictable cycles of wet years and dry years, Andean communities have developed 
complex irrigation and water systems based on communal management and small-scale 
farming practices that are locally relevant to the physical geography and climatology, as 
well as consistent with cultural practices and beliefs. While these systems and cultural 
practices differ based on the community, in general, “water provides a strong material 
and spiritual basis for Andean life-ways and cultural orientations, one that has a firm 
foundation in ancient infrastructure and in well-developed understandings that join sacred 
landscapes to production, community, the commons, and cultural identity” (Gelles 2010, 
137). Water system management has historically taken place on a community level, but 
its importance transcends the community scale, as evidenced by the larger claim of the 
right to manage water (distinctly different from a claim of the right to own the water). 
Water rights for many indigenous and campesino peoples of the Andes typically 
include “claims that encompass both the right to access and withdraw water and the right 
to determine rules for managing water use systems” (Boelens et. al 2010, 5), so water 





Government passed Water Law 2029, the many indigenous and campesino water systems 
were disallowed and everyone was forced to pay for their water, even those who were not 
connected to the central water system, causing whole communities to lose their legal 
water access. When Aguas de Tunari privatized the water, the people lost their ability to 
determine water management rules. These threatened everything about the people’s 
relationship to the water. 
In order to create a successful movement, “the Water Wars mobilized a discourse 
centering on the defense of indigenous ‘traditional use and distribution of water’ as 
collective cultural right. Many of the protestors were urban mestizos (not self-identified 
indigenous); yet usos y costumbres [uses and customs] became a powerful discourse 
which cut across race, class, and social sectors in order to negotiate for ‘collective’ water 
rights” (Albro (2005) and Olivera and Lewis (2004) in Fabricant 2013, 161). Extending 
the usage of indigenous assertions of water as a collective cultural right beyond 
indigenous peoples and to all peoples of Cochabamba demonstrated the solidarity 
embedded in the Water War, and offered a distinct and specific statement to fight for.  
 
The Initial Organizing 
According to Oscar Olivera, the creation of the Coordinadora de Defensa del 
Agua y de la Vida (Coalition in Defense of Water and Life) was “an effort to reconstruct 
a social network, or the social fabric of solidarity, that had been destroyed by 
neoliberalism” (Olivera 2004, 25). The coalition also was created to protect the rights of 
mother earth and the “idea that water belongs to the community and no one has the right 





the movement and gaining support from groups outside its own members. 
 In the creation of the Coordinadora, Olivera, as a union leader, had deep 
connections to the workers represented by the large and small unions in Cochabamba, but 
he recognized the existence of a large portion of workers outside of organized labor, 
namely women and children, who made up about 80% of the workforce (Olivera 2004, 
25). Through media exposure, these sectors of “invisible work” became better 
understood, and Olivera began to recognize the importance of cross-sector solidarity. He 
began promoting this so much so that “everybody came around seeking solutions to their 
problems” (Olivera 2004, 26).  
It was during this time that he became aware of the water privatization issue 
through irrigation farmers, who had organized a protest against the new water law in 
1999. Olivera says he did not understand the water law until the irrigation farmers 
“explained the water law in detail and how our systems in the workers’ neighborhoods 
would be affected, especially by rate hikes and confiscations” (Olivera 2004, 28). These 
explanations—ways of making tangible to common people what the State, the World 
Bank, and Aguas de Tunari were doing, and the real effects it would have—became 
critical in mobilizing the masses. Rallying behind a convoluted and seemingly abstract 
law is difficult; when people understand how it will directly impact their family and life, 
it is much easier to mobilize. Olivera and the leaders recognized this, and created a 
summary of five bullet points stating how Law 2029 would affect the common people 
(Olivera 2016). This five-point plan helped facilitate the understanding of “the 
importance of joint actions and believing that no individual sector alone could marshal 





salvation. Social well-being would be achieved for everyone, or for no one at all” 
(Olivera 2004, 28). This assertion challenged capitalistic and neoliberal ideals of 
competitive individualism, and suggested the need for a mode of organization that 
emphasized societal liberation and solidarity outside of neoliberal and neocolonial modes 
of organizing.  
  
Introduction to Decoloniality 
Decoloniality is a mode of thinking that de-links from and works to create 
narratives outside of colonial thought. While it was not expressly used in the creation of a 
successful movement in Bolivia, it can be applied to help understand the real tactics used 
that differentiated the Water War from other protest movements. Mignolo, together with 
Quijano and Escobar, helped theorize decoloniality in the 1990s. Epistemological 
delinking from colonialism—thinking outside of colonial modes of organization, and 
offering political, social, and economic on-the-ground alternative thoughts and actions 
outside of eurocentrism—forms the basis of decoloniality. Decoloniality arose within and 
centered around Latin America (as opposed to postcolonialism, which arose largely out 
of Asia and Africa), created by Latin American scholars and understandings of 
colonialism and coloniality of power (see introduction).  
The broader goals of decoloniality include helping us see modernity, Western 
civilization, development, and capitalism as only one option of many, and this one option 
was defined by those who benefit from it, which shows “how it became hegemonic: 
economic, political, epistemic and institutional beliefs coalesced to suggest there is only 





capitalism and westernization, and that existing outside these hegemonic systems of 
organization involves delinking from them. If modes of thinking don’t de-link from 
colonial or Western thought, or if “coloniality is disrupted but still maintained, the legacy 
of coloniality prevents the construction of an economically just world, of equitable and 
ethical future social organizations” (Mignolo 2012).  
Mignolo acknowledges two common modes of delinking, dewesternization and 
decoloniality. Dewesternization challenges “Occidentalism, racism, a totalitarian and 
unilateral globality and an imperialist epistemology” but “only questions who controls 
capitalism—the West or ‘emerging’ economies” (Mignolo 2008), rather than questioning 
capitalism altogether. Dewesternization is a step in the direction of decoloniality.  
Decoloniality, however, fundamentally interrogates the roots of the legacy of colonialism 
and neocolonialism. 
Thus, in a decolonial project, we must work to release the control knowledge 
from the powerful within the current hegemony, and reimagine the economic and 
political world structure (Mignolo 2012). Decoloniality centers the communal, which has 
already existed before and alongside capitalism, but has been systematically discounted 
by the capitalist mentality. Oftentimes, these modes of organization are “non-Western 
categories of thought through Western-categories of thought” (Mignolo 2012), meaning 
that even though they are outside capitalism, they are still being conceptualized through 
capitalist thought. Decoloniality strives to conceptualize these modes of organizing 
outside of capitalist thought. To achieve this kind of thinking outside and beyond 
colonialism and capitalism, Olivera and the other leaders of the Water War drew on 






The Coordinadora became an organizing body that contested ideas within 
hegemonic organizing powers, becoming “the ‘conscience of the people’—a living, 
breathing force that monitored and challenged the actions of government and big business 
alike. It became the organ that could interpret and decipher the basic demands of the 
population” (Olivera 2004, 29), while also recognizing a multiplicity of needs, desires, 
ontologies and epistemologies. In these ways, the organization epitomized decoloniality 
without explicitly using the academic theory behind it.  
To draw solidarity across varying needs and desires, the five-point plan focused 
on issues that would affect more than one population. Olivera and the Coordinadora 
reached out to many seemingly disjointed groups for a planned mobilization on 
December 1, 1999. To Olivera’s surprise, ten thousand people showed up (Olivera 2004). 
The resistance offered a well-articulated option for the government to end the contract 
with Aguas de Tunari, with the threat of shutting down the city otherwise.  
When the government didn’t respond, the Coordinadora and the Civic Committee 
(local elites who wanted to create a political space for themselves, but who had initially 
voted for the privatization) joined together with a massive strike and blockades. What 
turned into a multi-day blockade (though the Civic Committee was only in it for the first 
day) became violent at the hands of police, when they brought out tear gas and gassed the 
peaceful negotiators. This infuriated the people, who brought their water bills to the city 
center and burned them in an act of symbolic resistance. When the government still 
didn’t respond constructively to the protest, the people planned a peaceful movement 





The name of the takeover movement terrified the local authorities, even though 
the Coordinadora insisted that it was peaceful and symbolic. Ignoring the statements by 
the Coordinadora, the government employed local security guards as well as the 
dálmatas (Dalmatians), a police force from La Paz. When Feb. 4th came, the police were 
ready with their tear gas and clubs. The people pushed on, and many downtown residents 
who had initially been watching from their windows joined the crowds in the streets as 
more and more people became infuriated by the police and the rising water rates. As one 
college student, Luis Gonzales, said, “‘all of Cochabamba was up in arms…. People from 
all different political and social groups came together in the street barricades to confront 
the police’” (Gonzales in Dangl 2007, 59). 
The next day, on February 5th, the whole city had been blockaded, and with the 
media reporting on how many people were occupying the streets, more and more people 
joined in disbelief and protest. On this day, the people took matters into their own hands, 
choosing to fight for their rights. Kids built barricades, elderly people banged on pots in 
the streets, and, most notably of all, as Olivera described, “as we left the shelter of our 
houses and our communities, we started to talk among ourselves, to know one another, 
and to regain our trust in ourselves and each other” (Olivera 2004, 36). The people began 
to support each other and the community as a whole, and this strengthened community 
fabric and started to build the foundation of solidarity among irrigators, cocaleros (coca 
farmers), miners, students, and more.  
The fight wasn’t over. The government failed to change the contract with Aguas 
de Tunari as promised, so the movement escalated its demands, now calling for a 





from the government, the “final battle” took place—eight days of intense protests, 
blockades, and strikes. The “barricades were made with objects of daily life in houses, 
like tables, chairs, stoves, disabled people left wheelchairs, kids left toys, and it was also 
symbolic by saying the privatization affects daily life of the people” (Olivera 2016). The 
occupation of the streets inspired more and more protestors to join.  
 The people held meetings, committees, and town hall meetings, some attended by 
50,000 to 70,000 people. One of these led to the decision by the people to take over the 
Aguas de Tunari building, “symbolically occupying the company’s offices, ripping down 
its big sign, and everything” (Olivera 2004, 39), but still the police did not show up. The 
protesters continued to push Olivera to talk to the government, which was having private 
meetings with various other groups but refusing to speak with the Cordindadora. Olivera 
attempted to enter the Aguas de Tunari building, and almost immediately the police came 
with tear gas and arrested him. The people were infuriated; 40,000 protesters showed up 
in the main plaza to occupy the center of town until the government acted.  
The next day there were orders for Olivera’s assassination, as well as conflicting 
news on whether the government was going to lift the contract or not. People continued 
to protest, and the army grew more violent. One army member shot and killed 17-year-
old Víctor Hugo Daza on April 8th, who wasn’t even protesting (Dangl 2007, 66). In a 
standoff, the protesters continued to occupy the city and the government continued to 
adhere to the contract and enact violence on the streets. After significant governmental 
mismanagement, on April 10th, the Prefect of Cochabamba said in a phone call to 
President Banzer, “‘this is not some radical group, it is all of Cochabamba’” (Kohl and 





government and the protesters decided to create a transitional board of directors that 
included representatives from the Coordinadora as well as the mayor’s office and 
unionized workers to figure out a new way to manage the water.  
 
Afterthoughts on the War 
Olivera later commented, “these were the most anguished days of my life. I was 
not at all afraid of the government, of their bullets. I was afraid that the people would not 
agree with the decisions we might take. That was my fear” (Olivera 2004, 44). Olivera’s 
comment highlights the difficulty of having a representative for a movement that 
represents many diverse groups and interests in the search for plurinational coexistence—
the recognition of the existence of more than one national group within a state. But in the 
end, the people believed in him as a spokesperson because he considered multiple 
viewpoints and because he was fighting for liberation for all.  
The departure from Western individualistic modes of thinking can be seen within 
the Andean indigenous communities, as Mignolo explains. He argues that the communal 
in the Andes is a form of social and economic organizing that survived alongside 
European colonization, and is now “being re-inscribed, but the re-inscription is grounded 
in the revamping and expansion of Aymara and Quechua categories of thought” (Mignolo 
2012). Conceptualizations of these ideas of the communal outside western economic 
conceptions of common-pool resources and the commons rely on three related concepts 
to decoloniality—epistemic disobedience, border thinking, and delinking. 
Epistemic disobedience is “thinking in exteriority, in the spaces and time that the 





coloniality” (Mignolo 2011). Similarly, border thinking encapsulates epistemologies 
outside of the rhetoric of “modernity,” capitalism and eurocentrism, and represents a 
break from hegemony in the search for alternatives outside the system, rather than 
alternatives within the system. Border thinking also highlights “the ability to speak from 
more than one system of knowledge” as “an act of pluralizing epistemologies” (Mignolo 
2008). The Water War occupies a space of decoloniality, a moment of challenging 
hegemonic development models and globalization that is embedded in a larger history of 
resistance and existence outside of the so-called Western world, because the people of 
Cochabamba came together and began to reimagine an existence without neoliberal 
implementation of IMF and World Bank projects, and without neocolonial decisions over 
their water system.  
The Water War was just the beginning of an entire movement toward 
decoloniality based on indigenous and campesino modes of organizing that challenge 
dominant hegemonic economics, politics, and international relations. Within 
decoloniality, people “become epistemically disobedient, and think and do decolonially, 
dwelling and thinking in the borders of local histories confronting global designs” 
(Mignolo 2011). This is exactly what the people of Cochabamba did—they confronted 
global designs by prioritizing alternative ways of understanding relations between each 
other and with natural resources. 
Olivera, in reflecting back on the months of protest, negotiations, town halls, 
coalitions, and coordination, saw the larger significance of the Water War. Yes, they won 
the water system back from a multinational corporation, but more than that, the people 





to see a fight for the right to true democracy, where the people would have a voice in 
state decisions. Olivera said that, “we also had to ‘unprivatize’ the very fabric of society. 
We discovered how difficult it was to reconstruct solidarity in a society that had been 
fragmented and atomized by neoliberalism” (Olivera 2004, 47). In recognizing the 
difficulty of building strong solidarity under Western organization, the Cochabambinos 
uncovered the importance of restructuring the way society is organized, in order to give 
voice to the people.  
Olivera commented that through the Water War, the people learned three things: 
one, “it is ordinary working people who achieved justice,” two,  “all of our individualism, 
isolation, and fear evaporated into a spirit of solidarity” and three, “we want a 
government that takes our views into account—not the interests of the international 
financial institutions and their neoliberal politicians” (Olivera 2004, 49). These three 
realizations would form the basis for reordering of Bolivian society over the next fifteen 
years, and represent decoloniality and alternative epistemologies that enabled alliance 
















Right after the successful halting of the water privatization, a woman stopped Oscar 
Olivera and said to him: 
Compañero, now the water is still going to be ours, what have we really 
gained? […] My husband will still have to look for work. As a mother and 
a wife, I will still have to go out into the street to sell things, and my 
children will have to drop out of school because there’s just not enough 
money. Even if they give us the water for free, our situation still won’t 
have gotten any better. We want Banzer to leave, his ministers to go with 
him and all the corrupt politicians to leave. We want social justice. We 
want our lives to change. (Olivera 2004, 48)  
 
This hard-hitting assertion highlights how one successful protest movement 
cannot solve all the problems. The changes have to come from deeper down, from 
beyond the system, from decolonial epistemologies and reimagined ways of organizing 
and living. After returning the water system to the public, it did not instantly become an 
effective system. People still suffered from lack of water and of means to address this 
beyond constructing their own water systems. What this social movement did achieve 
was the empowerment of the Cochabambinos. The Water War catalyzed a decade of 
rejection of neoliberalism and utilization of decolonial epistemologies that led to 
nationalization of many industries and assertion of indigenous and Plurinational 
sovereignty in Bolivia.  
The Water War made clear the power of community organization and solidarity, 
and as Olivera explained to us in the classroom of 31 students in Cochabamba, “the most 
important thing was that people left their houses and began to talk, like brothers, equals, 





in the street, and got back their trust in one another. They lost their most powerful enemy; 
they lost their fear. The people weren’t afraid of anything” (Olivera 2016).  
In the years since the Water War, Bolivia has made huge strides forward in 
decolonizing and re-defining Bolivia, and expelling neoliberalism. In February 2003, the 
IMF pressured the Bolivian government to increase taxes to address the economic deficit. 
The government needed the loan to pay public employees, so they proposed a tax 
increase on the poorest people. In response, the police force—typically the ones to 
repress protest and enforce state policies—went on strike. The people, led by presidential 
runner-up from the 2002 election, cocalero Evo Morales, joined the police, as mayhem 
broke out across the country. The military attempted to fight and stop the strikers and 
protestors, using tear gas and snipers and killing 31 people. Finally, the president 
announced, “‘our budget will not be the budget of the International Monetary Fund,’” 
(Dangl 2007, 87), and as the social fabric of solidarity continue to grow, the people of 
Bolivia said no to another international power.  
In 2005, riding momentum from the social movements of the previous few years, 
Evo Morales became the first indigenous president in Latin America, as a member of the 
Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS or Movement towards Socialism) party. Under Morales, 
the country has undergone major changes, including the passage of a new constitution in 
2008. This new constitution established Bolivia as a Plurinational state, recognizing the 
many indigenous nations. Bolivia also passed a law in 2010 recognizing the rights of 
Pachamama (Earth Mother) as the rights of a person. Establishing in the national 
constitution that Earth deserves rights is a step toward decolonizing the view of nature as 





decolonial in practice, due to its continued existence within the capitalistic world 
economy) to emphasize a shift toward dewesternization and recognition of models 
beyond single nation-states (Mignolo 2014, 31).  
While the state’s shift toward decoloniality, solidarity, and a reimagining of 
relations between each other and with nature are in many ways inspiring, Bolivia 
continues to struggle. Cochabambinos fought for something they deeply believed in, and 
they were victorious in overturning the privatization, but in the years since the Water 
War, Cochabamba has grappled consistently with drought and potable water distribution. 
They are still amidst a 25-year drought, and since 2016—sixteen years after the fight for 
water sovereignty—many communities have had to truck in water and then carry it to 
their houses. As glaciers continue to melt, and as the population continues to grow, 
conflicts over water between rural peasants, city dwellers, miners, farmers, and other 
people will continue to dominate life in Bolivia.  
Clearly privatization, in the way it was introduced and managed, is not the 
answer, but if the public system isn’t working effectively, what is the next step? Who 
plays a role in defining the process? Is there a mode of regulating water in times of 
drought, water shortage, or water conflict that is within decolonial modes of thinking that 
would prioritize the indigenous and campesino populations but also take into account the 
urban mestizo, rather than the Bolivian State, the World Bank, or multinational 
corporations like Bechtel?  
Decoloniality offers an introduction into modes of delinking from the oppressive 
structures of colonialism and capitalism. Introducing decoloniality into questions of states 





heterogeneity, communal organizing, and societal organization on smaller and more 
manageable scales. Decoloniality departs from traditional nation-state rhetoric and 
incorporates all scales from the ultra-local to the global, understanding that no relations 
can happen in an isolated bubble, but that smaller-scale relations that occur outside of 
hegemonic capitalist globalized orderings are legitimate, appropriate, and often effective, 
and deserve to be recognized.  
Decolonial thought that extends from and relates to indigenous epistemologies of 
Andean cultures adds nuance to our understanding of nature, allowing us to see that 
humans are not separate from, but part of nature, and play a role in constructing and 
utilizing non-human nature. Decolonizing nature involves the reinstating of humans to 
the natural ecosystems, understanding that society functions as an ecosystem, or a system 
of ecosystems, that is intimately tied to other forms of nature and ecosystems. 
Pachamama, or Earth Mother, does not provide resources for exploitation, but rather for 
a symbiotic relationship. 
 
Beyond Bolivia 
Through the success of the Water War, the power of community organizing 
became evident, not only to the people within the community, but to the whole world. 
Moving beyond Bolivia, this case study is important because as water demand increases 
worldwide, conflicts over water will only increase in intensity. Many fights to overturn 
water privatization occurred during the same decade that Bolivia fought (see appendix 
table 3). These struggles are not just about access to water. As Guevara-Gil, Boelens and 





echelons. These disputes are typically over resource distribution, over the contents of 
rights and rules, over affirmation of the authority to generate and enforce these rules, and 
over the discourses representing them” (Guevara-Gil, Boelens and Getches 2010, 337). 
Not only does the Cochabamba Water War raise questions about water as a resource, it 
introduces questions about sovereignty, control, ownership and justice in water wars 
across the world.  
 Decolonial power grows with the recognition of the oppressive practices of 
organizations like the World Bank or Bechtel. As Goldman argues, “in spite of 
widespread food riots and marches by the unemployed in major third world cities 
throughout the 1980s, the opportunity to build cross-sectional movements was lacking 
largely because it was difficult to understand precisely the source of these oppressive 
changes” (Goldman 2005, 273). As powerful international actors become more exposed 
globally, and as more people and communities across the world recognize that people 
power can truly counteract hegemonic power, the closer we will be to creating a 
worldwide movement toward decoloniality, solidarity, and coexistence. 
Ironically, with increasing grassroots movements toward social and 
environmental justice and against hegemonic institutions such as the World Bank, these 
same hegemonic institutions are creating new programs surrounding indigenous and other 
marginalized groups’ rights, as new forms of development (Goldman 2005, 289). What 
does it mean that the World Bank is now jumping on this next new “opportunity”? What 
does it mean for NGOs and other transnational social or environmental groups to get 
involved in these movements? Goldman argues that the World Bank’s desires to create 





optation and a shift in focus from small communal radical fights to institutionalized NGO 
projects. Not only does this risk poor implementation of non-culturally relevant practices, 
but it involves powerful groups once again taking ownership of what is not theirs—not 
land, natural resources, or money, but ideology.  
While this Bolivian case study offers many important take-aways, it also 
introduces more questions. Where does this leave us? How can we implement larger 
fights for social and environmental justice across multiple scales? How can we 
decolonize our relationships with each other, with nature, and with knowledge, if we do 
not have long histories of indigenous or campesino organizing outside of capitalism and 
colonialism?  The possibility of a transnational solidarity network of anti-neoliberal and 
decolonial projects could be the “world-historic shift in oppositional politics” (Goldman 
2005, 290) that is necessary to truly challenge hegemonic, capitalistic, and multinational 
power. But is this possible to create without further marginalizing those so deeply 
embedded in the system that they rely on loans or food aid to survive? Is it possible to do 
so without co-opting movements and appropriating customs and forms of organization 
deeply embedded within specific geographies?  
 
Final Thoughts 
The Cochabamba Water War illuminates tensions between understandings of 
nature, international space, and power, colonial and decolonial epistemologies and 
ontologies, and forms of social organizing and organization. In Bolivia during the 
postcolonial period we see a new nature—socionature—emerge, as societies and natural 





becomes impossible. The disputed nature of water in Cochabamba offers a deep look into 
a nature “that is both imaginary and material: the product of labor and history, the 
bedrock for all life, and, yet, at the same time, the elusive and deeply contested subject of 
intense political debates” (Kosek 2006, 286). The materiality of water and its importance 
to daily life locates these struggles concretely, yet autonomy over water and water 
systems is also important to cultural consciousness in the Andes. Water represents a form 
of socionature that articulates on multiple scales, from the local to the international. The 
international in the case of the Water War is not just within the World Bank, the United 
States, or other international actors, but also permeates throughout Bolivia, crossing 
space and time and taking on many forms. The internationalization of Bolivia’s space and 
nature have helped to structure socionature along lines of power and exploitation, and the 
introduction of decolonial ideals have contested the power embedded in that socionature. 
How we relate to nature introduces questions of how we relate to other people. Do we 
interact with respect? Do we leave space for non-dominating, decolonial relationships?  
We must work with each other, and with our non-human surroundings, to 
reimagine decolonial relationships of solidarity and counter-hegemonic power. To truly 
address the inequalities and injustices in the world, we must create and build multi-scalar, 
culturally relevant, contextualized, and anti-normative solutions based in mutual respect 
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P006110 1964 ENDE Power Project Bolivia 10.0 
P006111 1964 BPC Power Project Bolivia 5.0 
P006112 1967 Beni Livestock Development Project Bolivia 2.0 
P006114 1969 Interim Beni Livestock Project (03) Bolivia 1.4 
P006115 1969 Gas Pipeline Project Bolivia 23.3 
P006113 1969 ENDE Power Project (02) Bolivia 7.4 
P006116 1971 Livestock Development Project (03) Bolivia 6.8 
P006117 1972 Railway Project Bolivia 8.0 
P006119 1973 ENDE Power Project (03) Bolivia 6.0 
P006118 1974 Mining Credit Project Bolivia 6.2 
P006120 1975 Agricultural Credit Project Bolivia 7.5 
P006121 1975 Railway Project (02) Bolivia 32.0 
P006125 1976 Small Scale Mining Development Project Bolivia 12.0 
P006129 1976 Water Supply and Sewerage Project Bolivia 11.5 
P006123 1976 Banco Industrial Mining Project Bolivia 10.0 
P006124 1976 Power Project (04) Bolivia 25.0 
P006122 1976 Ingari Rural Development Project Bolivia 9.5 
P006132 1977 Urban Development Project Bolivia 17.0 
P006127 1977 Aviation Development Project Bolivia 25.0 
P006128 1977 Railway Project (03) Bolivia 35.0 
P006126 1977 Education and Vocational Training Project Bolivia 15.0 
P006131 1978 Highway Maintenance Project Bolivia 25.0 
P006130 1978 Ulla Ulla Rural Development Project Bolivia 18.0 
P006137 1979 Santa Cruz Water Supply Project Bolivia 9.0 
P006134 1979 National Mineral Exploration Fund Project Bolivia 7.5 
P006133 1979 Omasuyos - Los Andes Rural Development Project Bolivia 3.0 
P006136 1980 Structural Adjustment Loan Project Bolivia 50.0 
P006135 1980 Gas and Oil Engineering Project Bolivia 16.0 
P006154 1986 Gas Recycling Project - Vuelta Grande Bolivia 15.0 
P006164 1986 Reconstruction Import Credit Project Bolivia 55.0 
P006165 1987 La Paz Municipal Development Project Bolivia 15.0 
P006168 1987 Reconstruction Import Credit II Project Bolivia 47.1 
P006176 1987 Emergency Social Fund Project (01) Bolivia 10.0 
P006163 1987 Power Rehabilitation Project Bolivia 6.8 
P006160 1987 Public Financial Management Project Bolivia 11.5 
P006170 1988 Economic Management Strengthening Operation Bolivia 9.7 
P006159 1988 Financial Sector Adjustment Credit Project Bolivia 70.0 
P006175 1988 Emergency Social Fund Project (02) Bolivia 27.0 
P006187 1989 FIN SCTR Bolivia 9.1 
P006161 1989 Mining Sector Rehabilitation Project Bolivia 35.0 
P006167 1989 Export Corridors Project Bolivia 37.0 
P006183 1989 FINAN SCTR Bolivia 11.3 














Major Cities Water Supply and Sewerage 
Rehabilitation Project Bolivia 35 
P006192 1990 FIN SEC ADJ SUPLM III Bolivia 14.5 
P006179 1990 Private Enterprise Development Project Bolivia 16.1 
P006182 1990 Social Investment Fund Project - SIF Bolivia 20 
P006153 1991 Agro Export Development Program Bolivia 22.5 
P006195 1991 SAC (IDA REFLOW) Bolivia 10.4 
P006184 1991 Structural Adjustment Credit Project Bolivia 40 
P006189 1991 Public Financial Management (02) Project Bolivia 11.3 
P006188 1991 Agricultural Technology Development Project Bolivia 21 
P006201 1992 SAC (IDA REF2) Bolivia 11.1 
P006194 1992 Environmental Technical Assistance Project Bolivia 4.8 
P006180 1992 Road Maintenance Project (02) Bolivia 80 
P006196 1993 Integrated Child Development Project Bolivia 50.7 
P006200 1993 Social Investment Fund Project (02) Bolivia 40 
P039862 1994 SAC SUPLM4(IDA REFLO Bolivia 8.6 
P006181 1994 Education Reform Project Bolivia 40 
P037005 1994 
Regulatory Reform and Capitalization Technical 
Assistance Project Bolivia 14.7 
P006190 1994 Municipal Sector Development Project Bolivia 42 
P035710 1994 SAC SUPLM III (IDA REFLOW) Bolivia 9.4 
P006186 1995 Environment, Industry & Mining Project Bolivia 11 
P044266 1995 CAPTLZTN PRG/IDA REF Bolivia 8 
P006191 1995 Power Sector Reform Technical Assistance Project Bolivia 5.1 
P034606 1995 
Financial Markets and Pension Reform Technical 
Assistance Project Bolivia 9 
P006202 1995 Rural Communities Development Project Bolivia 15 
P006173 1995 Capitalization Program Adjustment Credit Bolivia 50 
P006178 1995 
Hydrocarbon Sector Reform and Capitalization 
Technical Assistance Project Bolivia 10.6 
P006197 1995 National Land Administration Project Bolivia 20.4 
P006205 1995 Judicial Reform Project Bolivia 11 
P049307 1996 CAPITALZTN2-IDA REFL Bolivia 5.4 
P006206 1996 Rural Water and Sanitation Project Bolivia 20 
P056342 1997 CAPITZN PROG/IDA REF Bolivia 2.9 
P040110 1997 
FINANCIAL DECENTRALIZATION & 
ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT Bolivia 15 
P057030 1998 Regulatory Reform Sector Adjustment Credit Project Bolivia 40 
P064228 1998 REG REF ADJ (IDA REF Bolivia 1.78 
P057396 1998 
REGULATORY REFORM & PRIVATIZATION 
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE Bolivia 20 
P006204 1998 Education Quality and Equity Strengthening Project Bolivia 75 
P040085 1998 Participatory Rural Investment Project Bolivia 62.8 
P055974 1998 El Nino Emergency Assistance Project Bolivia 25 
P060392 1999 Health Sector Reform Project Bolivia 25 
P062790 1999 Institutional Reform Project Bolivia 32 
P055230 1999 ABAPO-CAMIRI HIGHWAY Bolivia 88 
P065902 2000 
Environmental Management Capacity Building Pilot 
Project of the Hydrocarbon Sector  Bolivia 4.8 






Table 3- Campaigns against Water Privatization. Source: Goldman 2005, 259 
